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I write as a physicist, with the knowledge that many physicists are studying
the mathematical structure of our physical universe and hope to be able to find
a ‘theory of everything,’ or TOE, that will give a complete set of dynamical laws
for this structure. This would essentially give the rules for how all the physical
quantities in the universe evolve. Such a TOE would not be itself give the boundary
conditions also necessary to determine the history of the universe, so it is a misnomer
to say that it is a ‘theory of everything,’ but it is convenient to retain the acronym
TOE for this dynamical part of the laws of physics. Some physicists, such as Hartle
and Hawking [1], are also seeking to find rules specifying the boundary conditions
(BC) of the universe as well. The combination of the TOE and the BC would then
give a complete description of the mathematics of the state of the universe and its
evolution. (This might be called a ‘Theory Of More of Everything,’ or TOME.)
However, if one takes an even broader view, one realizes that even the TOME
(the TOE and the BC) would not really comprise a theory of everything either, since
they do not specify what conscious experiences occur within the universe. At least
this seems to be the case if the TOME is assumed to be of the general mathematical
types that are currently being sought, since such types do not seem by themselves
to specify precisely what conscious experiences occur.
Nevertheless, there is the general consensus that there should be some sort of
‘psycho-physical parallelism’ or connection between the mathematical structures de-
scribed by current and sought-for theories of physics and the conscious experiences
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that each of us apparently has. Indeed, it can be argued that all we directly expe-
rience are these conscious experiences themselves, and our feelings that there is a
mathematical structure for the physical world seems to be ultimately based upon
the enormous success of our partial glimmerings of such a structure in explaining
many aspects of our conscious experiences. In other words, we do not seem to ex-
perience directly the mathematical structure at all, but we seem to experience the
feeling that our partial theories for such a structure help us better understand our
experiences.
For example, as part of some of my conscious experiences while writing this, I
have a feeling that I am looking at a computer screen that (except for the details
of what is displayed upon it) is very similar to what I would consider to be the
same computer screen that I think I remember viewing at many times in the past.
Furthermore, I have the feeling that my understanding of the feeling of the existence
and persistence of certain properties of what I interpret to be the computer screen
in front of me, is helped by my effective partial theory of the existence of this screen
as a physical object and of its approximate “object permanence” over the relevant
timescales. (Incidentally, I do not believe that any ultimate theory of physics will
have any precisely existing persons such as “I,” any precisely existing “objects”
such as computers screens, any absolute notions of “personal identity” or “object
permanence,” or even any absolute notion of time or of timescales, but to illustrate
my ideas, I am merely using the crude notions from a rough instrumentalist theory
to denote how “I” feel “I” “believe” ideas about an “external” “physical” world seem
to help explain my “internal” “mental” experiences.)
Therefore, very crudely, I think that I have the experience of remembering my
computer screen as a persisting object because, according to my rough theory, there
is such an object in the physical world.
Such a rough theory can be refined, and I might believe that a better theory
claims that my conscious experience is more directly correlated with (or is “caused
by”) certain physical processes within my brain. The point is that it certainly seems
to have explanatory value to assume that in some sense there exists a physical world,
and that our conscious experiences are either part of it or else are correlated with
it.
Of course, it is logically possible that only the conscious experiences by them-
selves exist (or even just the one conscious experience that I am having “now,” to
take an extreme solipsistic view that denies even the existence of my past experi-
ences as anything other than the partial contents within the memory components of
my present experience). However, the experienced correlation between the different
components of the content of even my present experience would then seem to lack
the explanation that appears possible from the assumed existence of an external
physical world.
Therefore, I shall assume that an external physical world does exist in some
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sense and is helpful for explaining our conscious experiences. For it to be helpful,
it must be connected or correlated with the internal conscious experiences in some
way, and this connection is the ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ or PPP that I shall
assume exists.
Now the question arises as to what the form is of this assumed ‘psycho-physical
parallelism.’ This form will of course be dependent upon the form of the two en-
tities that are being connected, the internal conscious experiences and the external
physical world. I am certainly no expert on the academic work that has been done
on theories of the form of the internal conscious experiences, though I can claim to
experience at least one of them directly myself. On the other hand, I have done aca-
demic work for many years on theories for the form of the external physical world,
and so I have some idea of the constraints of current physical theories on that end
of the psycho-physical connection, even though we physicists certainly do not yet
have the complete physical theory or TOME described above, and I would not be
personally competent to assess it fully even if we physicists as a community did have
such a theory.
An essential point here is that, so far as we know, and so far as current physics
theories give any strong hint, the external physical world seems to be thoroughly
quantum mechanical. Therefore, as Quentin Smith [2] has emphasized in this vol-
ume, a realistic theory of the ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ should include the quan-
tum nature of the physical world in order to be consistent with the most basic feature
of our current best theories of physics.
I should say that, unlike some, I do not believe that it is necessarily impossible
for there to exist a (different) universe in which the physics is entirely classical and
yet conscious experiences exist and are correlated with that external physical world.
However, I am strongly convinced that such a classical universe is not ours, and so if
we want a correct theory of the psycho-physical connection for our universe, we must
include the quantum nature of our universe (or possibly whatever it is that replaces
the quantum if our current quantum theories are entirely superseded, though I think
it highly unlikely that such a future theory would revert entirely to the completely
classical picture held before quantum theory was discovered).
Of course, there are a multitude of ways in which one might postulate a connec-
tion between conscious experiences and a quantum physical world. Quentin Smith
[2], Barry Loewer [3], and Michael Lockwood [4] have discussed three within this
volume. However, rather than reviewing the various possibilities that have been
proposed, I wish to summarize my own conjecture for the framework or basic form
of the connection. When emphasizing the quantum side of the connection, I have
called this Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) [5, 6], but, for reasons that will
become apparent, when emphasizing the conscious side of the connection, I might
call it Mindless Sensationalism (MS).
Mindless Sensationalism is very similar in many ways to the many-minds theories
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developed by Lockwood [7, 8, 9, 4] and by David Albert and Loewer [10, 11], except
that the basic conscious entities, which Mindless Sensationalism asserts there are
“many” of, are conscious experiences rather than minds.
By a “conscious experience,” I mean all that one is consciously aware of or con-
sciously experiencing at once. Lockwood has called this a “phenomenal perspective”
or “maximal experience” or “conscious state.” It could also be expressed as a total
“raw feel” that one has at once. In my papers on Sensible Quantum Mechanics [5, 6],
I have usually called it merely a “perception” or sometimes an “awareness” or “sensa-
tion,” but I do not wish to imply that I am using the same subtle meanings for those
terms that others might. For example, I am not merely considering an individual
sensory perception, or even just the set of simultaneous sensory perceptions of things
external to the brain. Instead, what I mean by a conscious experience or perception
is a total conscious awareness, a “subjective,” “internal,” “first-person” experience
by roughly what one crudely thinks of as one conscious “being,” at roughly the one
“time” that is then felt by the conscious “being” to be “now.” (However, I hasten
to say that I doubt the absolute existence of any uniquely identifiable conscious
“beings” within our universe, and I also doubt the existence of any entity with the
precise properties commonly ascribed to “time,” except possibly for the admitted
existence of mental concepts within the contents of certain conscious experiences
themselves. For me the conscious experiences themselves are the fundamental enti-
ties, and it is only in trying to illustrate, in commonly understood language, what
I mean by them, that I am apparently forced to describe them in terms of what I
regard as less fundamental concepts such as “conscious beings” and “at one time”
or “now.”)
A conscious experience can include components such as a visual sensation, an
auditory sensation, a pain, a conscious memory, a conscious impression of a thought
or belief, etc., that are all experienced together. However, it does not include a
sequence of more than one immediate experience that in other proposals might be
considered to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness of an individual
mind.
Because I regard the basic conscious entities to be the conscious experiences
themselves, which might crudely be called sensations if one does not restrict the
meaning of this word to be the conscious responses only to external stimuli, and
because I doubt that these conscious experiences are arranged in any strictly defined
sequences that one might define to be minds if they did exist, my framework has
sensations without minds and hence may be labeled Mindless Sensationalism.
I should also emphasize that by a conscious experience, I mean the phenomenal,
first-person, “internal” subjective experience, and not the unconscious “external”
physical processes in the brain that accompany these subjective phenomena. In his
first chapter, Chalmers [12] gives an excellent discussion of the distinction between
the former, which he calls the phenomenal concept of mind, and the latter, which
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he calls the psychological concept of mind. In his language, what I mean by a
conscious experience (and by other approximate synonyms that I might use, such
as perception or sensation or awareness) is the phenomenal concept, and not the
psychological one.
Now that I have tried to illustrate what I mean by the conscious experiences that I
take to be the basic entities that make up what might be called the “internal” mental
world (which I shall here call the “conscious world”), let me turn to a quantum
description of what might be called the “external” physical world. (This world I
shall here call the “quantum world” to avoid offending the materialists who say that
consciousness is part of the “material world,” whatever that is supposed to mean,
and to avoid offending the physicists, myself included, who claim that consciousness
is part of the “physical world,” whatever that is supposed to mean—as a physicist I
shall take it to mean roughly whatever is studied by those who consider themselves
doing physics. I’ll nevertheless inevitably offend the smaller number of quantumists
who consider consciousness to be a quantum phenomenon, but I want some short
phrase to denote the non-conscious aspects of a physics description of our universe,
without of course intending to deny that there is a relation between consciousness
and the quantum world.)
For those who object that my terminology implies an unrealistic dualism between
the internal mental world and the external physical world (between the “conscious
world” and the “quantum world” as I am using these terms), I can say that I do not
wish to imply that there is necessarily a fundamental distinction between these two
“worlds,” but at the present level of description it seems to help to recognize the dis-
tinction between the two ways of describing aspects of our universe. Physicists often
try to describe some aspects of our universe by using the mathematical language
of current physics and ignoring consciousness, and it seems that others (idealists?)
can consider conscious experiences separately from the aspects of our universe that
physicists usually consider. There may be a deeper level of understanding at which
the “conscious world” and the “quantum world” are unified, but to get to this level
it does not seem to me to help to pretend that at our present level of understanding
our descriptions do not usually make a distinction between what appears to be these
two different aspects of reality.
Rather than restricting attention to particular theories or theoretical frameworks
for the quantum world, such as nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, relativistic quan-
tum field theory, quantum gravity, or quantum string or M theory, I shall here focus
on what I consider to be the basic elements of quantum theory as I presently un-
derstand it.
In the Feynman path-integral approach, the basic elements of quantum theory
might be a set of “paths” or fine-grained histories allowed for the universe, and a
rule for assigning to each such history a complex number called an “amplitude” (a
number of the form of a real number plus i, the square root of −1, times another real
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number; the complex number is itself real if the real number multiplying i is 0). (The
dynamical ‘theory of everything’ or TOE would then be primarily concerned with
specifying the rule for assigning the amplitudes, and the boundary conditions or BC
would essentially tell what paths are to be included.) That is not the whole story in
this approach, however, as there seems to be a need to combine the individual paths
into appropriate sets of paths and add up the amplitudes for all the paths in each
set. Precisely how this is to be done is a bit mysterious to me, and so I find it a bit
clearer to try to relate consciousness more directly to another approach to quantum
theory, which might be called the operator approach. (There are crude rules for
which amplitudes in the path-integral approach to add up in practical situations,
but I’m not sure these rules are not implicitly invoking some assumptions about
something like consciousness, whereas at the level of discussing only what I am
calling the quantum world, I would like to start with a set of structures that do not
depend in any way on consciousness.)
In the operator approach, the basic elements of quantum theory might be a set
of “operators” obeying some algebra (rules for adding and multiplying them), along
with some “quantum state” (or simply “state”) for the universe that determines
a complex number called the “expectation value” for each operator. I shall give
some examples below, but for now one can think of the operators as some abstract
mathematical entities that can be multiplied by complex numbers, added or sub-
tracted, and multiplied together to give other operators. The expectation value of
the operators, determined by the quantum state, is required to be linear in that
the expectation value of the new operator that is a certain complex number times
the old operator is simply that complex number times the expectation value of the
old operator, and the expectation value of the sum of two operators is simply the
sum of the expectation values of the two separate operators. (However, the expec-
tation value of the product of two operators is not, in general, the product of the
expectation values of the two separate operators.)
In the operator approach, the operators are somewhat analogous to the ampli-
tudes for the paths in the path-integral approach and so would be the part primarily
determined by the TOE. Similarly, the quantum state is somewhat analogous to the
set of allowed paths in the path-integral approach and so would be primarily deter-
mined by the BC. Getting the expectation value for an operator would be analogous
to adding up the amplitudes for a certain set of paths. (Actually, on this issue
the operator approach seems a bit more complete, since to say what an operator
means in the path-integral approach, one needs to say which set of paths contribute
to each operator, usually with an additional complex weighting factor besides the
amplitudes for the paths themselves.)
As an example of the operator approach, consider the example of a ‘universe’
consisting of a single nonrelativistic particle moving in one spatial dimension, e.g.,
along the x-axis. In this simple case, the quantum states can be represented by
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‘wavefunctions’ that are complex functions of x, say ψ(x), and which are square-
integrable, meaning in this case that the integral of |ψ(x)|2 over all x is finite. (The
absolute value squared of a complex number, such as ψ = ψR + iψI with ψR and ψI
being the two real numbers that make it up, is |ψ|2 = ψ2R + ψ2I , a real nonnegative
quantity that is the square of the distance, from the origin, of the point representing
ψ on the complex plane, which itself has a horizontal, or ‘real,’ axis representing
the real part, ψR, of the complex number ψ, and a vertical, or ‘imaginary,’ axis
representing the imaginary part, ψI , of the complex number ψ.)
In this one-dimensional quantum example, operators are mathematical entities
that represent ways of changing one wavefunction to another in a linear way. For
example, corresponding to the position x that the particle might be considered to
have in a classical description, there is the quantum position operator, say X , that
converts a wavefunction ψ(x) to the wavefunction xψ(x). (Strictly speaking, X is
not really a well-defined operator if the space of states is represented by all square-
integrable wavefunctions, since there exist square-integrable wavefunctions ψ(x),
such as ψ(x) = 1/
√
pi(1 + x2), for which xψ(x) is not square-integrable, but to get
a simple example, I shall here ignore the mathematical technicalities that one can
use to get a class of wavefunctions for which X is a good operator.) Similarly, corre-
sponding to the momentum p that the particle might have in a classical description,
there is the quantum momentum, say P , that converts a wavefunction ψ(x) to the
wavefunction −idψ(x)/dx.
Operators change states in linear ways, so for complex numbers a and b, the
operator aX + bP converts a wavefunction ψ(x) to the wavefunction axψ(x) −
ibdψ(x)/dx.
The product of two operators, such as PX , has the effect of performing the op-
erations on the right first, followed by the operation to the left. Thus PX converts
a wavefunction ψ(x) to the wavefunction −id(xψ(x))/dx = −ixdψ(x)/dx − iψ(x).
Note that, in general, the product of two operators depends on the order in which the
are taken, so XP converts a wavefunction ψ(x) to the wavefunction −ixdψ(x)/dx,
the same as PX − iI does, where I is the identity operator that converts a wave-
function ψ(x) to the same wavefunction ψ(x). This example shows that, for any
wavefunction, XP = PX − iI or PX −XP = iI. (This is a so-called commutation
relation, since PX −XP , which is mathematically denoted by [P,X ], is called the
commutator of P and X . This commutation relation is what essentially gives the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation for momentum and position, but it would take me
too far afield to explain that here.)
Now that I have given an example of operators from one-dimensional nonrel-
ativistic quantum mechanics, let me illustrate how quantum states give expecta-
tion values to operators. In Dirac’s ‘bracket’ notation, a ‘pure’ quantum state can
written as the ‘ket’ |ψ〉, which in my example is represented by the wavefunction
ψ(x) = ψR + iψI , or alternatively, it can be written as the ‘bra’ 〈ψ|, which is rep-
7
resented by the complex conjugate wavefunction ψ¯(x) = ψR(x)− iψI(x). A slightly
better representation of the pure state is the combination |ψ〉〈ψ|, which avoids the
phase ambiguity in representing a pure state by either |ψ〉 or 〈ψ| individually, since
the state is physically the same if |ψ〉 is multiplied by the complex phase factor
eiθ = cos θ + i sin θ and 〈ψ| is multiplied by the complex conjugate phase factor
e−iθ = cos θ − i sin θ for some real angle θ measured in radians (degrees divided by
180 and multiplied by pi, so that a 180-degree rotation is represented by θ = pi, which
gives eiθ = e−iθ = −1). The phase factor has no physical consequences, and indeed
|ψ〉〈ψ| remains unchanged by it, since eiθe−iθ = 1 so that eiθ|ψ〉〈ψ|e−iθ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
The result of an operation, say X , on a quantum state denoted by |ψ〉 can be
then denoted as X|ψ〉, say |φ〉, and represented by the wavefunction φ(x) (which in
this particular case is xψ(x)). Then the expectation value of X , denoted by 〈X〉, is
the ‘inner product’ of the bra 〈ψ| with the ket |φ〉 = X|ψ〉, which is
〈X〉 = 〈ψ|X|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉 =
∫
∞
−∞
dxψ¯(x)φ(x) =
∫
∞
−∞
dxψ¯(x)xψ(x). (1)
One can readily see from this example that the expectation value is linear in the
operators, e.g.
〈aX + bP 〉 = a〈X〉+ b〈P 〉, (2)
but in general,
〈XP 〉 6= 〈X〉〈P 〉. (3)
Although for my purposes below it is generally sufficient to think of the universe
as having a pure quantum state, for completeness I should say that besides the pure
states best represented by the single term |ψ〉〈ψ|, one can have ‘mixed’ or ‘statistical’
states represented by a sum of such terms,
ρ =
∑
i,j
cij|ψj〉〈ψi|, (4)
with a set of different kets |ψi〉 and bras 〈ψj |, where the cij ’s form what is known
as the density matrix, which is Hermitian (cij = c¯ji), positive (eigenvalues non-
negative), and normalized (eigenvalues summing to unity). For such a state, the
expectation value of an operator such as X is
〈X〉 = tr(Xρ) = ∑
i,j
cij〈ψi|X|ψj〉. (5)
For infinitely large systems, there are even more general states, known as C*-
algebra states, which need not be represented by normalized density matrices. In-
stead, such states are represented by positive linear functionals of the operators. (A
functional of a set of operators is something analogous to a formula that gives a
number for each operator. A positive functional gives positive numbers for positive
operators, which are operators that have positive eigenvalues. A linear functional
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gives a number for the sum of two operators that is the sum of the two numbers that
it would give for each operator individually.) If such a state is written symbolically
as σ, then one can write the expectation value of an operator like X as 〈X〉 = σ[X ].
The pure and mixed states described above are then special cases of these more
general C*-algebra states, so for generality we can denote any quantum state by a
positive linear functional σ.
So far I have not put time into the picture. I believe that time is not a basic
fundamental part of physics, so in the ultimate description of the quantum world (at
least if it continues to use what I am here regarding as the fundamental entities of
quantum theory), there will be operators and a quantum state for the universe, but
no time. However, in most of our approximate quantum theories for models of parts
of the universe, time does enter. For example, in nonrelativistic quantum theory,
in the Heisenberg picture I shall use when speaking of time, the quantum state is
considered to be independent of time, but the operators, like X and P , are defined
to be functions of the time t, as X(t) and P (t). (The wavefunction that represents
the time-independent quantum state |ψ〉 is then also a function of time, ψ(x, t).)
Then the quantum algebra relates the operators at different times. For example, for
a free particle of unit mass, the relation takes the simple form
X(t) = X(0) + tP (0) (6)
and
P (t) = P (0). (7)
The form of the relation of these operators at different times, which I am considering
to be part of the algebra of the operators, depends on the dynamics of the system, for
example on the forces on the particle in this simple one-dimensional example. One
might say that if time does not really exist, then there is no dynamics, which would
trivialize the TOE, but I take the attitude that it is the algebra of the operators
(the rules giving all their sums and products) that represents the dynamics, and this
can persist even if time as we usually know it does not.
I might add that even if one has time within some model system, such as the
one-dimensional nonrelativistic quantum mechanical model described above, if this
system is really a closed quantum system, what I believe is important about it is
described by the quantum state and the quantum operators, but not the represen-
tation of the operators at various times. For example, in Eq. (6), even though X(t)
has a different representation from X(0) + tP (0), I believe there is fundamentally
no distinction between them, because they are equal operators. Therefore, even in
models in which a time such at t exists, the operators cannot be uniquely identi-
fied with any single time, and so what I regard as the basic quantum entities are
effectively timeless. Only if one augments the basic quantum theory of states and
operators with distinctions between different forms of the same operators, such as
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the left and right hand sides of Eq. (6), does one get any real dependence upon the
time parameter t.
If the quantum world is described by operators and states (with our universe
being described by one particular set of operators and by a particular state, the
so-called ‘quantum state of the universe’), then a goal of a theory of psycho-physical
parallelism (PPP) would be to give the connection between the quantum state of the
universe and the conscious experiences occurring within it. Eschewing the extreme
solipsistic view that only my present conscious experience exists, I assume that
many conscious experiences exist within the universe, so a PPP should give many
conscious experiences for a single quantum state.
Suppose that one denotes an individual conscious experience by the letter p and
defines the “conscious world” M as the set of all possible conscious experiences in
all universes with all possible quantum states (i.e., not just in our universe with its
particular quantum state σ). One logically possible view would be that all possible
conscious experiences exist equally, regardless of the quantum state. But this would
make the quantum world completely irrelevant for the existing conscious experiences,
and so the apparent order that I sense within my present experience would not at
all be explained by any postulated quantum world. On the contrary, I feel that
the order that I sense within my own experience is better explained by assuming
that there is a quantum world and that the conscious experiences are in some sense
correlated with it. Therefore, I shall make this assumption, that there is indeed a
nontrivial psycho-physical parallelism.
The next possibility one can consider is the assumption that the quantum state
of the universe restricts the set of conscious experiences that actually exist to be a
proper subset, say E, of the set M of all possible conscious experiences, but that
each conscious experience within the existing set E is equally real. This would seem
to be a reasonable assumption if the quantum world were actually classical, so that
some physical possibilities definitely happen and others do not. Then it would be
plausible that some conscious experiences definitely happen and that others do not.
For example, suppose that one takes a simplified nonrelativistic classical model
in which there are a certain set of pointlike elementary particles that move along
definite trajectories through space as a function of time, so that at each time there
is a definite configuration of the positions of these particles in space. The temporal
sequence of these configurations could then be called the classical history of this
universe. Certain sets of the configurations might be identified as conscious brain
states, and for each of these one might identify a corresponding conscious experience
p. Then one might propose that if a configuration corresponding to the conscious
experience p occurs during the classical history of this universe, then this conscious
experience exists, but if the configuration never occurs, the corresponding conscious
experience does not exist either. If there is some correspondence between the or-
derliness of the physical brain configurations and the orderliness perceived within
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the conscious experience, then an orderly history could explain orderly conscious
experiences.
A similar picture with a definite sequence of configurations occurs in the deBroglie-
Bohm version of nonrelativistic quantum theory [14, 15, 16, 17, 18], in which to the
normal operators and state there is added a definite trajectory whose evolution, but
not whose initial configuration, is determined by the wavefunction, which acts as a
‘pilot wave.’ However, it seems to me unnecessary to add a trajectory to quantum
theory, which for completeness would require a specification of its initial configura-
tion as additional information. It also seems very ugly to try to do this for examples
beyond nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. For example, in relativistic quantum
field theory, a trajectory of sequences of field configurations that obeyed Bohm’s
equation for the evolution of the configurations using the time corresponding to one
observer would not obey that equation using instead the time corresponding to a
moving observer, so that relativistic invariance would be broken by the trajectories.
However, in a quantum theory with operators and a state, unless one adds extra
elements like the definite trajectory of Bohm’s version of quantum theory, it seems
difficult or ugly to have the operators and state give a definite rule for saying that
some possible conscious experiences definitely exist but that others do not. It is
much easier to have a rule assigning different (nonnegative real) weights or levels of
reality to different conscious experiences, with the rule depending upon the quantum
state of the universe. Then if all conscious experiences with positive weights w are
said to exist, but if experiences with greater weights exist in some sense more, then
one might expect that it is more likely that one’s experience would be one that
has greater weight. (One might like to propose that one simply takes all possible
conscious experiences with positive weight as existing and all possible conscious
experiences with zero weight as not existing, but for the simplest ways of assigning
the weights from quantum theory, such as what I shall give below, almost all of the
possible conscious experiences would have a weight at least a tiny bit positive, so
this proposal would exclude as nonexisting only an infinitesimally small fraction of
the total set M of conscious experiences p. Therefore, I am not considering this
particular proposal further.)
In other words, if the weight w(p) gives the level of reality or existence of the
conscious experience p, one can say that in the universe almost all possible conscious
experiences exist in the sense of having at least some positive measure of reality, but
some sets of experiences are much more real than others, existing to a much greater
degree than other sets. One way to describe this is to imagine randomly selecting
a conscious experience p out of all of the possible ones. For a random selection one
always needs a weight, and if it is chosen to be the weight w(p) that comes from the
quantum state σ by some particular theory of psycho-physical parallelism, then the
probability that a particular conscious experience p will be chosen by the random
selection will be proportional to its weight w(p).
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In this way one can say that the weight w(p) is analogous to the probability for
the conscious experience p, but it is not to be interpreted as the probability for the
bare existence of p, since any conscious experience p exists (is actually experienced)
if its weight is positive, w(p) > 0. Rather, w(p) is to be interpreted as being
proportional to the probability of getting this particular experience if a random
selection is made.
A more picturesque way of viewing the weight, but one which has the danger
of misinterpretation if all of the elements used in the picture are assumed to have
reality or are confused with similar elements that occur in our present approximate
theories of the world, is the following analogy: Assume that God has His own time
(not to be confused with the time that we use in our present approximate physical
theories, but having some properties analogous to what we often assume, perhaps
erroneously, that time does in our approximate physical theories), and that as He
creates each conscious experience, He spends a time w(p) giving existence to each.
In other words, assume that each exists for an amount w(p) of God’s time. Then the
conscious experiences with greater w(p) will have a greater existence in the sense
of their duration in God’s time. The picture is then that the weight for conscious
experiences may be viewed as somewhat analogous to the measure of physical time
used for calculating time averages in dynamical systems, for example.
Because the specification of the conscious experience p completely determines its
content and how it is experienced (how it feels), the weight w(p) has absolutely no
effect on that—there is absolutely no way within the experience to sense anything
directly of what the weight is. A toothache within a particular conscious experience
p is precisely as painful an experience no matter what w(p) is. Furthermore, the
experience p is whatever p is and has absolutely no memory of how long God may
have had that experience existing within His time in the analogy. It is just that an
experience with a greater w(p) is more likely in the sense of being more probably
chosen by a random selection using the weights w(p). (Of course, the experience p
might include a conscious awareness of belief in a theory that assigns a particular
weight to that experience, but the awareness of that belief will be part of p itself
and will not directly depend on whether the actual weight is what the believed
theory assigns for it. In this way a conscious belief depends only on the conscious
experience of which that belief is a part and not on the truth of the implications of
that belief. It is only by faith in the orderliness of the universe that we can assume
that our conscious orderly beliefs about it are true, and even that faith itself can be
regarded to be just given as part of the corresponding conscious experience.)
If one takes the attitude that there is no reality to a divine temporal period w(p)
for the existence of the conscious experience p (in the analogy that admittedly is
rather contrived), and that there is no reality to the random selection with weights
proportional to w(p), then one might think that the weights have no reality but are
merely a meaningless arbitrary assignment. I do find it difficult to try to describe the
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weights in terms of anything more basic and of whose existence I am more confident,
but I also believe that the weights really are fundamental elements of reality. In other
words, I believe that some sets of conscious experiences really do have a greater
measure of reality than others, and this greater measure is the explanation of why
my present experience has its experienced orderliness: such orderly experiences have
greater weight than ones which are much more disorderly. Of course, I cannot prove
this assumption, but it enables me to make progress toward finding an explanation
of the orderliness that I experience, so I shall continue to make it here.
One technical point that it is now time to make is that to simplify the discussion
above, I have often implicitly assumed that the set M of possible conscious expe-
riences is a countable discrete set, so that, for example, one can imagine choosing
an experience p at random with weight w(p). In particular, if the total sum of the
weights for all conscious experiences is finite and is normalized to be unity, then the
weight w(p) for each conscious experience is simply the probability for that expe-
rience to be chosen by the random selection. This is indeed the possibility that is
the easiest to visualize, and it generally will not hurt to have it in mind for most of
the discussion below, but in forming a fairly general framework for the connection
between the quantum and mental worlds, I would not like to make unnecesary re-
strictions, and so I shall allow the possibility that the set of conscious experiences
may be uncountable or continuous. (Is there a true continuum for the pain of a
toothache, or are there only a countable set of discrete values for how painful it can
be experienced? We don’t know which it is, so I shall allow either possibility.)
If the set M of conscious experiences is a continuum, then a nonzero weight for
a single conscious experience p (a point in this continuum) is rather meaningless,
but in reasonable cases one can still have a weight for any set S of experiences,
even if this weight is zero for any single individual experience. (For even this to be
possible, the set M of all possible experiences must be a measurable set, which I
shall continue to assume, since I personally don’t know how to make much sense of a
generalization in which that is not true.) To give the weight for a set of experiences
a fancier name, let us henceforth call it the measure µ(S) of the subset S of the full
set M of possible conscious experiences.
Then one can imagine that if exclusive subsets are being selected randomly with
the measure µ, then the ratio of the probability of choosing S1, say, to that of
choosing S2 would be µ(S1)/µ(S2), so the measures for the sets would give their
relative probabilities. If µ(M) is finite, then one can define a normalized weight
P (S) = µ(S)/µ(M) which would be the probability of choosing the subset S if one
randomly selected, with the measure µ, among an exhaustive and exclusive set of
subsets of M that includes the subset S. For example, if S1 is the set of conscious
experiences in which no toothache is felt and S2 is the set of conscious experiences
in which a toothache is felt, then these two subsets of M form an exhaustive and
exclusive set of two subsets ofM , since every conscious experience p inM is in S1 or
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S2 (exhaustive subsets), and no experience is in both (exclusive subsets). Therefore,
µ(M) = µ(S1) + µ(S2), and P (S2) = µ(S2)/µ(M) is the probability of randomly
selecting a conscious experience with a toothache.
However, it might be that the total set M of conscious experiences is so large,
and the measure µ(S) for its subsets S is so widely spread, that the total measure
of M is divergent. (A simple example would be if M could be put into one-to-one
correspondence with the real number line, −∞ < x <∞, and if the measure for the
set S = {x|x1 < x < x2} were µ(S) = x2 − x1, simply the length of the interval for
x.) Then any subset with finite measure µ(S) would have zero absolute probability
of being chosen if one divided by the infinite µ(M). Also, even if one chose subsets
with infinite measure, dividing that infinity by the infinity of the total measure
would generally give ambiguous results, and so absolute probabilities that are not
zero would be ambiguous. This might make it hard to test such a theory. However,
if one had two subsets with finite measure, say S1 and S2, then one would get a
finite conditional probability to be in, say, S1, given that one is in the union of the
two sets, and so there still might be some tests of such a measure that one could
make. Therefore, I am hesitant at this stage to demand that the total measure for
the full set M of all possible conscious experiences be finite.
Now, having explained briefly what I take the basics of quantum theory to be
and what it might mean to have a set of conscious experiences with a measure, it
is time to write these as axioms and add my axiom for the basic structure of the
psycho-physical parallelism.
Mindless Sensationalism (MS) is given by the following three basic postulates or
axioms [5]:
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious “quantum world” Q is completely
described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suitable state σ (a positive
linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value 〈O〉 ≡ σ[O] of each
operator O.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world” M , the set of all conscious
experiences or perceptions p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of
M .
Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious experiences is given by the expectation value of a corresponding “aware-
ness operator” A(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure, in the state σ of
the quantum world:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 ≡ σ[A(S)]. (8)
For A(S) to be a POV measure, it is necessary that A(S) be zero when S is the
empty set and otherwise be either zero or else a positive operator, which implies
that σ[A(S)] ≥ 0 for all positive linear functionals σ, and it is also necessary that
if the set S is a countable union of disjoint sets si, A(S) is the sum of the A(si)
when this sum “converges in the weak operator topology” [13]. Then µ(S) has the
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standard additivity property of a measure.
As essentially mentioned above in my description of what I consider to be the
basics of quantum theory, the Quantum World Axiom is here deliberately vague as
to the precise nature of the algebra of operators and of the state, because as the
details of various quantum theories of the universe are being developed, I do not
want the general framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics at this time to be made
too restrictive.
The Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom states my assumption of the structure
of the ‘psycho-physical laws,’ the laws that presumably give the ‘neural correlates
of consciousness.’ This axiom, when combined with the other two, gives what to me
seems to be the simplest and most conservative framework for “bridging principles
that link the physical facts with consciousness” and for stating “the connection at
the level of ‘Brain state X produces conscious state Y’ for a vast collection of complex
physical states and associated experiences” [12] in language that is consistent with
Sydney Coleman’s description [19, 20] of quantum theory as having “NO special
measurement process, NO reduction of the wavefunction, NO indeterminacy” (in
particular, with a many-experiences variant of Everett’s quantum theory [21, 22],
in which measures for sets of conscious experiences are added to the bare unitary
quantum theory that Coleman advocates).
The Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom is the simplest way I know of connect-
ing the quantum world with the conscious world. One could easily imagine more
complicated connections, such as having µ(S) be a sum or integral, over the con-
scious experiences p in the set S, of some nonlinear function of the expectation
values, say m(p), of positive “experience operators” E(p) depending in the p’s [5].
Instead, my Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom restricts the functions in the sum
or integral to be linear in the expectation values. In short, I am proposing that the
psycho-physical parallelism is linear.
Of course, the Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom, like the Quantum World Ax-
iom, is here also deliberately vague as to the form of the awareness operators A(S),
because I do not have a detailed theory of consciousness, but only a framework for
fitting it with quantum theory. My suggestion is that a theory of consciousness
that is not inconsistent with bare quantum theory should be formulated within this
framework (unless a better framework can be found, of course). I am also suspicious
of any present detailed theory that purports to say precisely under what conditions
in the quantum world consciousness occurs, since it seems that we simply don’t
know yet. I feel that present detailed theories may be analogous to the cargo cults
of the South Pacific after World War II, in which an incorrect theory was adopted,
that aircraft with goods would land simply if airfields and towers were built.
Since all sets S of conscious experiences with µ(S) > 0 really occur in the frame-
work of Mindless Sensationalism, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state
and the A(S) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements
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in MS. Nevertheless, because the framework has measures for sets of conscious expe-
riences, one can readily use them to calculate quantities that can be interpreted as
conditional probabilities. One can consider sets of conscious experiences S1, S2, etc.,
defined in terms of properties of the conscious experiences. For example, S1 might
be the set of conscious experiences in which there is a conscious memory of having
tossed a coin one hundred times, and S2 might be the set of conscious experiences
in which there is a conscious memory of getting more than seventy heads. Then one
can interpret
P (S2|S1) ≡ µ(S1 ∩ S2)/µ(S1) (9)
as the conditional probability that the conscious experience is in the set S2, given
that it is in the set S1. In our example, this would be the conditional probability that
a conscious experience included a conscious memory of getting more than seventy
heads, given that it included a conscious memory of having tossed a coin one hundred
times.
An analogue of this conditional “probability” is the conditional probability that
a person at the beginning of the 21st century is the Queen of England. If we consider
a model of all the six billion people, including the Queen, that we agree to consider
as living humans on Earth at the beginning of 2001, then at the basic level of this
model the Queen certainly exists in it; there is nothing random or probabilistic
about her existence. But if the model weights each of the six billion people equally,
then one can in a manner of speaking say that the conditional probability that one
of these persons is the Queen is somewhat less than 2×10−10. I.e., if one chooses at
random one of the six billion people on Earth at the beginning of 2001, with each
person being assigned an equal probability of being chosen, then the probability
of getting the Queen by this random selection is, to one-digit accuracy, 2×10−10.
(One can see that this probability of getting the Queen would be much more if one
instead weighted the probability for each person by the weight of his or her crown,
which would be analogous to having a different quantum state giving a different
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉.) I am proposing that it is in the same manner of speaking that one
can assign conditional probabilities to sets of conscious experiences, even though
there is nothing truly random about them at the basic level.
As it is defined by the three basic axioms above, Mindless Sensationalism is a
framework and not a complete theory for the universe, since it would need to be
completed by giving the detailed algebra of operators and state of the quantum
world, the set of all possible conscious experiences of the conscious world, and the
awareness operators A(S) for the subsets of possible conscious experiences, whose
quantum expectation values are the measures for these subsets.
Furthermore, even if such a complete theory were found, it would not necessarily
be the final theory of the universe, since one would like to systematize the connection
between the elements given above. As Chalmers eloquently puts it on pages 214-15
of his book [12], “An ultimate theory will not leave the connection at the level of
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‘Brain state X produces conscious state Y’ for a vast collection of complex physical
states and associated experiences. Instead, it will systematize this connection via
an underlying explanatory framework, specifying simple underlying laws in virtue of
which the connection holds. Physics does not content itself with being a mere mass of
observations about the positions, velocities, and charges of various objects at various
times; it systematizes these observations and shows how they are consequences of
underlying laws, where the underlying laws are as simple and as powerful as possible.
The same should hold of a theory of consciousness. We should seek to explain the
supervenience of consciousness upon the physical in terms of the simplest possible
set of laws.
“Ultimately, we will wish for a set of fundamental laws. Physicists seek a set of
basic laws simple enough that one might write them on the front of a T-shirt; in
a theory of consciousness, we should expect the same thing. In both cases, we are
questing for the basic structure of the universe, and we have good reason to believe
that the basic structure has a remarkable simplicity. The discovery of fundamental
laws may be a distant goal, however. . . .
“When we finally have fundamental theories of physics and consciousness in
hand, we may have what truly counts as a theory of everything. The fundamental
physical laws will explain the character of physical processes; the psychophysical
laws will explain the conscious experiences that are associated; and everything else
will be a consequence.”
Returning to the elements above of a postulated completed, but not necessarily
final, Mindless Sensationalism theory, it is presently premature to try to give these
elements precisely, particularly the awareness operators that have generally been
left out of physics discussions. However, one might give a crude discussion of what
they might be like in some highly approximate way.
One very strong assumption that might possibly be plausible for certain quantum
theories, is what I have called the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis [5]. In the
terms of the present paper, this implies that the awareness operators A(S) are
projection operators, say Π(S) (operators which remain the same when multiplied
by themselves: ΠΠ = Π, which implies that the eigenvalues of the operator are either
zero or one), and that the awareness operators for two disjoint sets of conscious
experiences, say S1 and S2, are orthogonal, so A(S1)A(S2) = A(S2)A(S1) = 0. (I
should say that I see several reasons for doubting that this very strong Commuting
Projection Hypothesis is really plausible as a precise condition on the awareness
operators, so I am not advocating this assumption as the final word, but it might be
approximately true at least for certain sets S of conscious experiences, and it does
lead to various simple consequences.)
A projection operator corresponds to a corresponding property that a state may
have with certainty (if it is an eigenstate of that operator with unit eigenvalue) or
that a state may be certain not to have (if it is an eigenstate of that operator with
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zero eigenvalue). For a given projection operator, a generic state is not an eigenstate
and so is not considered with certainty either to have the property or not to have it.
This is an expression of what is often considered the uncertainty of quantum theory,
though I would just regard it as a limitation on what “certain” properties a system
has.
In the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, to which I do not subscribe ex-
cept in a very rough instrumentalist sense, a ‘measurement’ is assumed to cause a
normalized quantum state to change or ‘collapse’ to another quantum state given by
applying a projection operator to the original state and then renormalizing its mag-
nitude. The expectation value of the projection operator, P = 〈Π〉 in the original
state, is then interpreted as the probability that that state will thus collapse, effec-
tively giving a “yes” answer to the question posed by the measurement of whether
the system being measured has the property corresponding to the projection opera-
tor Π. (1−P = 〈(I−Π)〉 is then the probability that the answer will be “no,” so that
the state will instead collapse to the other possibility, which is that given by applying
the complementary projection operator I−Π to the original state and renormalizing
it—here I is the identity operator that leaves a state the same.) The fact that Π
is a projection operator means that if the state collapsed to the “yes” answer, a
second measurement of precisely the same property would with certainty give the
answer “yes” again, so that after the state collapses the first time, to an eigenstate
of the projection operator with unit eigenvalue, the property corresponding to the
projection operator will with certainty be true.
To illustrate projection operators, return to the example of a single nonrela-
tivistic particle moving along the x axis, with its quantum state represented by a
wavefunction ψ(x) which is normalized so that the integral of |ψ(x)|2 over all x
is unity. In this case a simple example of a projection operator Π is one which
determines whether the particle is in some range of x, say the range x > 0. The ex-
pectation value of this is then P , the integral of |ψ(x)|2 over all positive x, and if the
quantum state collapses to this possibility in the Copenhagen version of quantum
theory, the wavefunction would change to ψ(x)/
√
P for x > 0 and to 0 for x < 0,
effectively giving a “yes” answer to the measurement determination of whether the
particle was to the right of the origin. On the other hand, if the answer is “no,”
which would occur with a probability 1 − P , the wavefunction would change to 0
for x > 0 and to ψ(x)/
√
1− P for x < 0. This change is known as the ‘collapse of
the wavefunction’ or the ‘reduction of the quantum state.’
In my Mindless Sensationalism, the quantum state of the universe never changes
by any collapse or reduction mechanism. However, if the awareness operator A(S) for
a certain set of conscious experiences is a projection operator Π, and if the quantum
state is normalized so that the expectation value of the unit operator I is unity, then
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 = 〈Π〉 = P , the same as the probability in the Copenhagen version
of quantum theory that measuring the property corresponding to Π would give a
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“yes” answer.
For example, it is tempting to suppose that if the set of conscious experiences
is a set of very similar experiences (or perhaps just a single experience if the set
of possible experiences is countably discrete) that would occur for a person having
a particular brain configuration, then A(S) is approximately a projection operator
onto those brain configurations. In this case, the measure µ(S) for those experiences
would then be the same as the probability for the corresponding brain configurations
in Copenhagen quantum theory.
The Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis appears to be a specific mathematical re-
alization of part of Lockwood’s proposal [7] (p. 215), that “a phenomenal perspective
[what I have here been usually calling a conscious experience p] may be equated with
a shared eigenstate of some preferred (by consciousness) set of compatible brain ob-
servables.” Here I have expressed the “equating” by my Quantum-Consciousness
Connection Axiom, and presumably the “shared eigenstate” can be expressed by a
corresponding projection operator Π.
Or, as Lockwood has expressed it in this present volume [4], “I am suggesting, in
other words, that the contents of consciousness, at any given moment, correspond
to a set of measurement outcomes that belong to the respective spectra of a com-
patible set of observables on the mind, construed as a subsystem of the brain.” If
this suggestion is incorporated within my axioms, it effectively assumes that the
awareness operators corresponding to sets of conscious experiences “at any given
moment” obey the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis. However, in my axioms I do
not need a definition of what “at any given moment” might mean, and I do not
need to be able to define the mind as a subsystem of the brain; for me the awareness
operators A(S) are basic. (I also do not need the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis,
though for now it is interesting to examine the consequences if it were true.)
I should also emphasize that if the same conscious experience is produced by
several different orthogonal “eigenstates of consciousness” (e.g., different states of a
brain and surroundings that give rise to the same conscious experience p), then in the
Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis the projection operator Π would be a sum of the
corresponding rank-one projection operators and so would be a projection operator
of rank higher than unity. This is what I would expect, since surely the surroundings
could be different and yet the appropriate part of the brain, if unchanged, would lead
to the same experience. As Lockwood has put it [4], “In particular, the contents of
consciousness would seem to be highly coarse-grained, in relation to the immensely
intricate physical processes on which they ostensibly supervene. This difficulty for
materialism was taken very seriously by the philosopher Wilfred Sellars [23], who
dubbed it the ‘grain problem’. . . . Crucially, I also assume that the compatible
set of observables, corresponding eigenvalues of which jointly define a given state of
consciousness, is a less than complete set. A complete compatible set of observables
is one that, when measured, yields maximal information concerning the measured
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system—information that cannot be improved on by adding further observables to
the set. This relates directly to the grain problem. Only by allowing the operative
compatible sets of observables to be incomplete can we ratchet down the degree of
resolution and complexity of the corresponding conscious state to what one would
intuitively judge to be the right level.”
On the other hand, if A(S) were a sum of noncommuting projection operators,
or even a sum of commuting projection operators that are not orthogonal, or if it
were a weighted sum of orthogonal projection operators with weights different from
unity, then generically A(S) would not be a projection operator Π as assumed in
the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis. Although it would mean that the situation
would not be so simple as one (e.g., Lockwood, or I in an optimistic moment) might
like to assume, I see no fundamental difficulty in having the awareness operators not
be projection operators and not be orthogonal.
There are many other alternative technical assumptions that one might make
about the awareness operators [5], but I shall not discuss them further here.
Another point I should emphasize is that in Mindless Sensationalism, there is no
fundamental notion of a correlation between distinct conscious experiences. One can
get the measure (and the normalized probability, if the total measure for the setM of
all conscious experiences is finite) for any set S of experiences, but one does not get
any nontrivial fundamental formula for the joint occurrence of distinct experiences.
In particular, there does not seem to be any fundamental formula for the conditional
probability of one set S of experiences given a second set S ′ that is exclusively
distinct, having no elements in common with the first set S (other than the formula
for the basic probability P (S) of the first set, the trivial conditional probability).
This essentially fits the crudely-expressed fact that by the definition of a conscious
experience p, a “conscious being” can be directly aware of only “one at a time.” From
the memory components of a “present” experience, one might postulate the existence
of a “past” experience in which what is now just remembered is at that “past” “time”
then experienced as occurring simultaneously with the “past” experience itself when
that experience was being experienced. However, within one’s present experience,
one has no direct experience of the past experience itself. Correspondingly, within
my framework of Mindless Sensationalism, there is no fundamental way to assign
a probability of a “past” experience given a particular present one. Instead, each
experience (if countably discrete, or else each set of experiences if one must combine
a continuum of them to get a nonzero measure µ(S)) has its own measure, which is
independent of the realization of any other experiences.
In the other direction of “time,” Mindless Sensationalism does not assign any
fundamental conditional probabilities to any “future” experiences given the existence
of a particular present one. One might think that it should, since it is just common
sense that probabilities for the future depend upon present conditions. For example,
in Copenhagen quantum theory, if the quantum state of the universe collapses to,
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say, an eigenstate with unit eigenvalue of one of a particular A(S) that is, say, a
projection operator Π, then one expects that the probabilities of future conscious
experiences will depend upon which A(S) the quantum state collapsed to. If the
quantum state collapses to an eigenstate of the assumed projection operator in which
you are aware of winning a large lottery, one would expect that a month later, the
probability that you would experience an awareness of having a lot of money would
be greater than if the quantum state collapsed to an eigenstate in which you were
not aware of winning any large lottery (assuming that you would not spend most of
the money within the month).
However, in Mindless Sensationalism, the measure or probability of any “future”
conscious experience is completely determined by the (full) theory and is indepen-
dent of the occurrence of any “present” conscious experience. This sounds absurd.
How can it be reconciled with our experience? I am aware of having a computer in
front of me; isn’t this correlated with my past awareness of buying a computer?
The answer is that this experience does not show any correlations between differ-
ent experiences (e.g., between those at different “times”) but rather the correlations
between the different components of a single present experience (e.g., of perceiving
a visual image of a computer screen and of being consciously aware of a memory of
buying the computer). These are the correlations to be explained by a full theory
of Mindless Sensationalism. (I’m just giving the framework here; the full theory
will involve an enormous amount of work, and I suspect that humans will never
completely develop it, though I hope they will learn a lot more about it than the
pittance we know now, and perhaps even develop an approximate outline of it.)
Similarly, a prediction of what might seem to be a correlation between a “present”
awareness of winning a large lottery and a “future” awareness of having a lot of
money is, I would claim, not that at all, but rather a prediction of a correlation
between one’s “future” awareness of having a lot of money and, within the same
conscious experience, a conscious awareness of a memory of having won a large
lottery.
To give another example, I can predict that if you are consciously aware of reading
this paper today (i.e., if you are not reading it in a daze, with no conscious awareness
of what you are doing, though I am not claiming that reading it unconsciously is
impossible or even that this possible experience is uncorrelated with the content of
this paper), you will consciously remember my phrase “Mindless Sensationalism”
tomorrow if you think about my paper then. Am I predicting something about
your experience tomorrow that is conditional upon your experience today? No. I
am just predicting that in your conscious experience of remembering reading this
prediction of mine the day before, within the same conscious experience there will
be a reasonably high probability that you will also be aware of my phrase “Mindless
Sensationalism.”
The fundamental timelessness of Mindless Sensationalism seems to fit very well
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with the viewpoint eloquently expressed by Julian Barbour [24], that “Heraclitan
flux . . .may well be nothing but a well-founded illusion.” (I might note that although
I almost entirely agree with what Barbour writes, I am perhaps not quite such as
extreme anti-temporalist in that I suspect that the quantum state of the universe
may be given by a path integral that has something analogous to histories in them,
even though I agree with Barbour that the universe fundamentally does not have
anything like a classical history or classical time. I think Barbour would also agree
with me that there are no fundamental sequences of conscious experiences.)
In saying that Mindless Sensationalism posits no fundamental correlation be-
tween complete conscious experiences, I do not mean that it is impossible to define
such correlations from the mathematics, but only that I do not see any fundamen-
tal physical meaning for such mathematically-defined correlations. As an example
of how such a correlation might be defined, consider that if an awareness operator
A(S) is a projection operator, and the quantum state of the universe is represented
by the pure state |ψ〉, one can ascribe to the set of conscious experiences S the pure
Everett “relative state” [21, 22]
|S〉 = A(S)|ψ〉‖ A(S)|ψ〉 ‖ =
A(S)|ψ〉
〈ψ|A(S)A(S)|ψ〉1/2 . (10)
Alternatively, if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the density
matrix ρ, one can associate the set of experiences S with a relative density matrix
ρS =
A(S)ρA(S)
Tr[A(S)ρA(S)]
. (11)
Either of these formulas can be applied when the awareness operator A(S) is not a
projection operator, but then the meaning is not necessarily so clear.
Then if one is willing to say that Tr[A(S)ρ] is the absolute probability for the
set of experiences S (which might seem natural at least when A(S) is a projection
operator, though I am certainly not advocating this na¨ıve interpretation, and in
general it will not agree in absolute magnitude with P (S) = µ(S)/µ(M)), one
might also na¨ıvely interpret Tr[A(S ′)ρS] as the conditional probability of the set of
experiences S ′ given the set of experiences S.
Another thing one can do with two sets of experience S and S ′ is to calculate an
“overlap fraction” between them as
f(S, S ′) =
〈A(S)A(S ′)〉〈A(S ′)A(S)〉
〈A(S)A(S)〉〈A(S ′)A(S ′)〉 . (12)
If the quantum state of the universe is pure, this is the same as the overlap prob-
ability between the two Everett relative states corresponding to the two sets of
experiences: f(S, S ′) = |〈S|S ′〉|2. Thus one might in some sense say that if f(S, S ′)
is near unity, the two sets of experiences are in nearly the same one of the Ev-
erett “many worlds,” but if f(S, S ′) is near zero, the two conscious experiences are
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in nearly orthogonal different worlds. However, this is just a manner of speaking,
since I do not wish to say that the quantum state of the universe is really divided
up into many different worlds. In a slightly different way of putting it, one might
also propose that f(S, S ′), instead of Tr[A(S ′)ρS], be interpreted as the conditional
probability of the set of experiences S ′ given the set of experiences S. Still, I do not
see any evidence that f(S, S ′) should be interpreted as a fundamental element of
Mindless Sensationalism. In any case, one can be conscious only of a single conscious
experience at once, so there is no way in principle that one can test any properties
of joint sets of conscious experiences such as f(S, S ′).
An amusing property of both of these ad hoc “conditional probabilities” for
one conscious experience given another is that they would both always be zero if
the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis were true. Even though the resulting theory
would generally be a “many-experiences” theory, it could be interpreted as being
rather solipsistic in the sense that in the relative density matrix ρp corresponding
to my present conscious experience p, no other disjoint set conscious experiences
would occur in it with nonzero measure! This has the appearance of being somewhat
unpalatable, and might be taken to be an argument against adopting the Orthogonal
Projection Hypothesis, but it is not clear to me that this is actually strong evidence
against the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis.
In addition to the fact that Mindless Sensationalism postulates no fundamental
notion of any correlation between individual conscious experiences, it also postu-
lates no fundamental equivalence relation on the set of conscious experiences. For
example, the measure gives no way of classifying different conscious experiences as
to whether they belong to the same conscious being (e.g., at different times) or to
different conscious beings. The most reasonable such classification would seem to be
by the content (including the qualia) of the conscious experiences themselves, which
distinguish the conscious experiences, so that no two different conscious experiences,
p 6= p′, have the same content. Based upon my own present conscious experience,
I find it natural to suppose that conscious experiences that could be put into the
classification of being alert human experiences have such enormous structure that
they could easily distinguish between all of the 1011 or so persons that are typically
assigned to our history of the human race. In other words, in practice, different
people can presumably be distinguished by their conscious experiences.
Another classification of conscious experiences might be given by classifying the
awareness operators A(S) rather than the content of the conscious experiences them-
selves. This would be more analogous to classifying people by the quantum nature
of their bodies (in particular, presumably by the characteristics of the relevant parts
of their brains). However, I doubt that in a fundamental sense there is any ab-
solute classification that uniquely distinguishes each person in all circumstances.
(Of course, one could presumably raise this criticism about the classification of any
physical object, such as a “chair” or even a “proton”: precisely what projection
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operators correspond to the existence of a “chair” or of a “proton”?) Therefore, in
the present framework conscious experiences are fundamental, but persons (or indi-
vidual minds), like other physical objects, are not, although they certainly do seem
to be very good approximate entities (perhaps as good as chairs or even protons)
that I do not wish to deny. Even if there is no absolute definition of persons in
the framework of Mindless Sensationalism itself, the concept of persons and minds
does occur in some sense as part of the content of my present conscious experience,
just the concepts of chairs and of protons do (in what are perhaps slightly different
“present conscious experiences,” since I am not quite sure that I can be consciously
aware of all three concepts at once, though I seem to be aware that I have been
thinking of three concepts).
In this way the framework of Mindless Sensationalism proposed here is a partic-
ular manifestation of Hume’s ideas [25], that “what we call a mind, is nothing but a
heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and
suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity” (p. 207),
and that the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (p.
252). As he explains in the Appendix (p. 634), “When I turn my reflexion on myself,
I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever
perceive any thing but the perceptions. ’Tis the composition of these, therefore,
which forms the self.” (Here I should note that what Hume calls a perception may
be only one component of the “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experience”
[7] that I have been calling a perception or conscious experience p, so one of my p’s
can include “one or more perceptions” in Hume’s sense.)
Furthermore, each awareness operator A(S) need not have any precise location
in either space or time associated with it, so there need be no fundamental place
or time connected with each conscious experience. Indeed, Mindless Sensationalism
can easily survive a replacement of spacetime with some other structure (e.g., super-
strings) as more basic in the quantum world. Of course, the contents of a conscious
experience can include a sense or impression of the time of the conscious experi-
ence, just as my present conscious experience when I perceive that I am writing
this includes a feeling that it is now A.D. 2001, so the set of conscious experiences
p must include conscious experiences with such beliefs, but there need not be any
precise time in the physical world associated with a conscious experience. That
is, conscious experiences are ‘outside’ physical spacetime (even if spacetime is a
fundamental element of the physical world, which I doubt).
As a consequence of these considerations, there are no unique time-sequences of
conscious experiences to form an individual mind or self in Mindless Sensationalism.
In this way the present framework appears to differ from those proposed by Squires
[26], Albert and Loewer [10, 11], and Stapp [27]. (Stapp’s also differs in having
the wavefunction collapse at each “Heisenberg actual event,” whereas the other two
agree with mine in having a fixed quantum state, in the Heisenberg picture, which
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never collapses.) Lockwood’s proposal [7] seems to be more similar to mine, though
he also proposes (p. 232) “a continuous infinity of parallel such streams” of con-
sciousness, “differentiating over time,” whereas Sensible Quantum Mechanics has no
such stream as fundamental. On the other hand, later Lockwood [8] does explicitly
repudiate the Albert-Loewer many-minds interpretation, so there seems to me to
be little disagreement between Lockwood’s view and Mindless Sensationalism ex-
cept for the detailed formalism and manner of presentation. Thus one might label
Mindless Sensationalism as the Hume-Everett-Lockwood-Page (HELP) interpreta-
tion, though I do not wish to imply that these other three scholars, on whose work
my proposal is heavily based, would necessarily agree with my present formulation,
which certainly is not contained in explicit detail in what they have written.
Of course, the conscious experiences themselves can include components that
seem to be memories of past conscious experiences or events. In this way it can be
a very good approximation to give an approximate order for conscious experiences
whose content include memories that are correlated with the contents of other con-
scious experiences. It might indeed be that the measure for conscious experiences
including detailed memories is rather heavily peaked around approximate sequences
constructed in this way. But I would doubt that the contents of the conscious ex-
periences p, the awareness operators A(S), or the measures µ(S) for the sets of
conscious experiences S would give unique sequences of conscious experiences that
one could rigorously identify with individual minds.
Because the physical state of our universe seems to obey the second law of ther-
modynamics, with growing correlations in some sense, I suspect that the measure
may have rather a smeared peak (or better, ridge) along approximately tree-like
structures of branching sequences of conscious experiences, with conscious experi-
ences further out along the branches having contents that includes memories that
are correlated with the present-sensation components of conscious experiences fur-
ther back toward the trunks of the trees. This is different from what one might
expect from a classical model with a discrete number of conscious beings, each of
which might be expected to have a unique sharp sequence or non-branching trajec-
tory of conscious experiences. In the quantum case, I would expect that what are
crudely viewed as quantum choices would cause smeared-out trajectories to branch
into larger numbers of smeared-out trajectories with the progression of what we
call time. If each smeared-out trajectory is viewed as a different individual mind,
we do get roughly a “many-minds” picture that is analogous to the “many-worlds”
interpretation [21, 22], but in my framework of Mindless Sensationalism, the “many
minds” are only approximate and are not fundamental as they are in the proposal of
Albert and Loewer [10]. Instead, Mindless Sensationalism is a “many-experiences”
or “many-sensations” interpretation.
Even in a classical model, if there is one conscious experience for each conscious
being at each moment of time in which the being is conscious, the fact that there
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may be many conscious beings, and many conscious moments, can be said to lead
to a “many-experiences” interpretation. However, in Mindless Sensationalism, there
may be vastly more conscious experiences, since they are not limited to a discrete
set of one-parameter sharp sequences of conscious experiences, but occur for all sets
of conscious experiences S for which A(S) is positive. In this way a quantum model
may be said to be even “more sensible” (or is it “more sensational”?) than a clas-
sical model. One might distinguish MS from a classical model with many conscious
experiences by calling MS a “very-many-experiences” framework, meaning that al-
most all sets of possible conscious experiences actually occur with nonzero measure.
(Thus MS might, in a narrowly literal sense, almost be a version of panpsychism,
but the enormous range possible for the logarithm of the measure means that it is
really quite far from the usual connotations ascribed to panpsychism. This is per-
haps comparable to noting that there may be a nonzero amplitude that almost any
system, such as a star, has a personal computer in it, and then calling the resulting
many-worlds theory pancomputerism.)
One might fear that the present attack on the assumption of any definite notion
of a precise identity for persons or minds as sequences of conscious experiences
would threaten human dignity. Although I would not deny that I feel that it might,
I can point out that on the other hand, the acceptance of the viewpoint of Mindless
Sensationalism might increase one’s sense of identity with all other humans and other
conscious beings. Furthermore, it might tend to undercut the motivations toward
selfishness that I perceive in myself if I could realize in a deeply psychological way
that what I normally anticipate as my own future conscious experiences are in no
fundamental way picked out from the set of all conscious experiences. (Of course,
what I normally think of as my own future conscious experiences are presumably
those that contain memory components that are correlated with the content of my
present conscious experience, but I do not see logically why I should be much more
concerned about trying to make such conscious experiences happy than about trying
to make conscious experiences happy that do not have such memories: better to do
unto others as I would wish they would do unto me.) One can find that Parfit [28]
had earlier drawn similar, but much more sophisticated, conclusions from a view in
which a unique personal identity is not fundamental.
The framework of Mindless Sensationalism can suggest various questions, meth-
ods of analysis, and speculations that might not occur to one using other frame-
works. I have done an analysis [5] of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) “paradox”
[29] combined with that of Schro¨dinger’s cat [30], finding that if the components
of one’s awareness are correlated with different physical properties that are highly
correlated (such as whether different parts of a cat are alive or dead), then one can
indeed predict that one’s conscious experience will have components that are highly
correlated. E.g., when one looks at the different parts of Schro¨dinger’s cat, one will
tend to have a strong agreement between the components of the awareness of the
26
different parts of the cat’s body as to whether the cat is dead or alive, if indeed the
actual awareness operators cause one to be aware of whether each part of the cat is
dead or alive. (If instead one were aware of whether each part of the cat were in the
symmetric or antisymmetric linear superposition of being alive or dead, one would
not have much agreement between the components of the awareness of the separate
parts as to whether they were in the symmetric or antisymmetric states.)
However, it still leaves it mysterious as to why we seem to be aware of the prop-
erties that are highly correlated (such as whether the different parts of a cat are dead
or alive), rather than of properties that are not highly correlated (such as whether
the different parts of a cat are in the symmetric or antisymmetric superpositions
of being dead or alive). In other words, it still is somewhat confusing to me why
in idealized cases our conscious experiences actually seem to be rather unconfused.
One might argue that if they were not unconfused, then we could not act coherently
and so would not survive. This would seem to be a good argument only if our
conscious experiences really do affect our actions in the quantum world and are not
just epiphenomena that are determined by the quantum world without having any
effect back on it. But on the other hand, it is not obvious how conscious experi-
ences could affect the quantum world in a relatively simple way in detail (though
it is easy to speculate on general ways in which there might be some effect; see [6]
and below). So although it appears to be unexplained, it conceivably could be that
conscious experiences do not affect the quantum world but are determined by it in
just such a way that in most cases they are not too confused. To mimic Einstein, I
am tempted to say, “The most confusing thing about conscious experiences is that
they are generally unconfused.”
As an aside, I should say that although epiphenomenalism seems to leave it
mysterious why typical conscious experiences are unconfused, I do not think it leaves
it mysterious that conscious experiences occur, despite a na¨ıve expectation that the
latter is also mysterious. The na¨ıve argument is that if the conscious world has no
effect on the quantum world (usually called the physical world [31, 12], in contrast
to my use of that term to include both the quantum world and the conscious world),
and if the development of life in the quantum world occurs by natural selection, the
development of consciousness would have no effect on this natural selection and so
could not be explained by it.
Nevertheless, one can give an answer analogous to what I have heard was given
by the late Fermilab Director Robert Wilson when he was asked by a Congressional
committee what Fermilab contributed to the defense of the nation: “Nothing. But it
helps make the nation worth defending.” Similarly, if epiphenomenalism is correct,
consciousness may contribute nothing to the survival of the species, but it may help
make certain species worth surviving. More accurately, it may not contribute to the
evolution of complexity, but it may select us (probably not uniquely) as complex
organisms which have typical conscious experiences. Then our consciousness would
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not be surprising, because we are selected simply as typical conscious beings.
This selection as typical conscious beings might also help explain why we can
do highly abstract theoretical mathematics and physics that does not seem to help
us much with our survival as a species. If we are selected by the measure of our
consciousness, and if that is positively correlated with a certain kind of complexity
that is itself correlated with the ability to do theoretical mathematics and physics,
then it would not be surprising that we can do this better than the average hominid
that survives as well as we do (say averaging over all the Everett many worlds).
Another question one might ask within the context of Mindless Sensationalism is
whether and how the measures of the sets of conscious experiences associated with
an individual brain depend on the brain characteristics. One might speculate that
it might be greater for brains that are in some sense more intelligent, so that in a
crude sense brighter brains have a bigger measure of conscious experiences. This
could explain why you do not perceive yourself to be an insect, for example, even
though there are far more insects than humans.
One might also be tempted to use this speculation to explain why you may
consider yourself to be more intelligent than the average human (though another
possible explanation is that it is likely that the average person considers himself
brighter than average). However, in this case the statistical evidence, if present
at all, is almost certainly much weaker than in the case of comparing ourselves
with ants. Therefore, this speculation should not be used to justify any politically
incorrect conclusions that one might be tempted to make from an assumption that
he or she has a greater measure of consciousness than most other humans.
Also, one might conjecture that an appropriate measure on conscious experiences
might give a possible explanation of why most of us perceive ourselves to be living
on the same planet on which our species developed. This observation might seem
surprising when one considers that we may be technologically near the point at
which we could leave Earth and colonize large regions of the Galaxy [32], presumably
greatly increasing the number of humans beyond the roughly 1011 that are believed
to have lived on Earth. If so, why don’t we have the conscious experiences of one
of the vast numbers of humans that may be born away from Earth? One answer is
that some sort of doom is likely to prevent this vast colonization of the Galaxy from
happening [33, 34, 35, 36], though these arguments are not conclusive [37]. Although
I would not be surprised if such a doom were likely, I would na¨ıvely expect it to
be not so overwhelmingly probable that the probability of vast colonization would
be so small as is the presumably very small ratio of the total number of humans
who could ever live on Earth to those who could live throughout the Galaxy if the
colonization occurs. Then, even though the colonization may be unlikely, I would
expect that it should still produce a higher measure for conscious experiences of
humans living off Earth than on it.
However, another possibility is that colonization of the Galaxy is not too improb-
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able, but that it is mostly done by self-replicating computers or machines who do
not tolerate many humans going along, so that the number of actual human coloniz-
ers is not nearly so large as the total number who could live throughout the Galaxy
if the computers or machines did not dominate the colonization. If the number of
these computers or machines dominate humans as “intelligent” beings (in the sense
of having certain information-processing capabilities), one might still have the ques-
tion of why we perceive ourselves as being humans rather than as being one of the
vastly greater numbers of such machines. But the explanation might simply be that
the measure of conscious experiences is dominated by human conscious experiences,
even if the number of “intelligent” beings is not. In other words, human brains may
be much more efficient in producing conscious experiences than the kinds of self-
replicating computers or machines which may be likely to dominate the colonization
of the Galaxy. If such machines are more “intelligent” than humans in terms of
information-processing capabilities and yet are less efficient in producing conscious
experiences, our conscious experiences of being human would suggest that the mea-
sure of conscious experiences is not merely correlated with “intelligence.” (On the
other hand, if the measure of conscious experiences is indeed strongly correlated with
“intelligence” in the sense of information-processing capabilities, perhaps it might
be the case that Galactic colonization is most efficiently done by self-replicating
computers or machines that are not so “intelligent” as humans. After all, insects
and even bacteria have been more efficient in colonizing a larger fraction of Earth
than have humans.)
It might be tempting to take the observations that these speculations might
explain (our conscious experiences of ourselves as human rather than as insect, and
our experiences of ourselves as humans on our home planet) as evidence tending to
support the speculations. One could summarize such reasoning as a generalization
of the Weak Anthropic Principle [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44] that might be called the
Conditional Aesthemic Principle (CAP, not entirely coincidentally the initials of my
wife Cathy Anne): given that we are conscious beings, our conscious experiences
are likely to be typical experiences in the conscious world with its measure.
Another use for the framework of Mindless Sensationalism would be to see how
various general approaches to the problems of consciousness can be expressed in
terms that are compatible (in the way I have suggested) with quantum theory. I
have personally read so little of these approaches (fewer books than I have fingers)
that I am not competent to try to see how to do that. However, I must admit that
from what little I have read of, say functionalism, and from my mental attempts to
translate what I have read into the language of my Mindless Sensationalism, I am
confused as to precisely how functionalism would be expressed.
Functionalism is supposed to be “the view that mental states are defined by
their causes and effects” [45]. If a particular “mental state” is to be identified with
a particular conscious experience p, then I am not clear what its “causes and effects”
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are supposed to be. Although I have no idea what the “effects” of p are supposed to
be, I suppose that in one sense one could say that its causes are both the experience
operator E(p) (the p-dependent operator whose sum or integral over the p’s in the
set S gives the corresponding awareness operator A(S)) and the quantum state of
the universe, σ, since both enter into the equation m(p) = σ[E(p)] for the weight
m(p) that is summed or integrated over the conscious experiences in a set S to give
the measure µ(S) for that set. If this interpretation of functionalism were correct,
a consequence for the conjecture of functionalism would be that no two distinct
conscious experiences, say p and p′, have the same experience operators: If p 6= p′,
then E(p) 6= E(p′). Equivalently, if E(p) = E(p′), then p = p′. This is certainly
a plausible conjecture, but I see no way to justify it or test whether or not it is
true, though I believe that it is a conjecture with real content and logically could
be either true or false.
Another interpretation might be to identify a “mental state” with a quantum
state that gives rise to a particular conscious experience p. If any state σ that gives
m(p) = σ[E(p)] > 0 is counted as a “mental state” that “gives rise” to p, then all
but a set of measure zero of possible quantum states σ could be said to “give rise”
to p. This seems far too broad, so let us see whether we can get a narrower class of
quantum states that “give rise” to p.
One way is to consider what different quantum states can be considered to con-
tribute “directly” to a conscious experience p. If, for a given conscious experience p,
the corresponding experience operator E(p) were decomposed into a weighted sum
of orthogonal rank-one projection operators Πi,
E(p) =
∑
i
WiΠi (13)
with positive weights Wi, then the eigenstate |ψi〉 with unit eigenvalue of each of
these projection operators Πi (the state which when written in the form |ψi〉〈ψi| is
identical to the rank-one projection operator Πi) would give a contribution to the
measure for the conscious experience p. In a sense one can say that it is each of
these eigenstates (one for each rank-one projection operator that occurs in Eq. (13))
that directly gives rise to the conscious experience p. (Of course, any state σ that
is not orthogonal to all of these eigenstates will give a positive weight for the the
conscious experience p,
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 = ∑
i
Wiσ[Πi] (14)
the weighted sum of the overlaps of the state σ with the eigenstates Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi|.
But it is the eigenstates themselves that can be considered to be most directly
related to the conscious experience p.)
So if the “mental states” corresponding to the conscious experience p are defined
to be the eigenstates Πi that occur in the sum given by Eq. (13)), the we can ask
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what the “causes and effects” of these are. If an answer to that could be found,
perhaps the conjecture of functionalism might be that any two “mental states” Πi
corresponding to the same conscious experience p would have the same “causes and
effects.” Or it might be the converse, that for any “mental state” Πi that occurs
in the sum given by Eq. (13)), any other rank-one projection operator with the
same “causes and effects” also occur in that sum. Either of these two conjectures
seems to have nontrivial content, but precisely what that content would be depends
upon what “having the same causes and effects” is taken to mean. Without an
understanding of that, my attempt to guess precisely what functionalism might
mean remain stymied.
Therefore, it would be interesting indeed to see how functionalism might possi-
bly be expressed in terms of the operators E(p) and A(S) that occur in Mindless
Sensationalism.
I have used the example of functionalism not merely to express my own confusion
(which might be merely due to my gross ignorance of the field), but also to illustrate
that if one can translate conjectures from the philosophy of mind into the language of
Mindless Sensationalism, one may be able to come up with some precise formulations
for them that would be applicable to the real universe and not just to some imaginary
universe that is modeled by, say, some classical Turing machine.
Similarly, it would also be an interesting challenge to interpret other approaches
to the problems of consciousness within the framework of Mindless Sensationalism. If
they cannot be interpreted within this framework, one would need to invent another
framework in which they might be interpreted in order for them to be consistent with
our quantum universe. This might impose a nontrivial constraint on approaches to
the problems of consciousness.
In conclusion, I am proposing that Mindless Sensationalism is the best framework
we have at the present level for understanding the connection between conscious
experiences and quantum theory. Of course, the framework would only become a
complete theory once one had the setM of all conscious experiences p, the awareness
operators A(S), and the quantum state σ of the universe.
Even such a complete theory of the quantum world and the conscious world
affected by it need not be the ultimate simplest complete theory of the combined
physical world. There might be a simpler set of unifying principles from which
one could in principle deduce the conscious experiences, awareness operators, and
quantum state, or perhaps some simpler entities that replaced them. For example,
although in the present framework of Mindless Sensationalism, the quantum world
(i.e., its state), along with the awareness operators, determines the measure for expe-
riences in the conscious world, there might be a reverse effect of the conscious world
affecting the quantum world to give a simpler explanation than we have at present
of the coherence of our conscious experiences and of the correlation between will
and action (why my desire to do something I feel am capable of doing is correlated
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with my conscious experience of actually doing it, i.e., why I “do as I please”). If
the quantum state is partially determined by an action functional, can desires in the
conscious world affect that functional (say in a coordinate-invariant way that there-
fore does not violate energy-momentum conservation)? Such considerations may
call for a more unified framework than Mindless Sensationalism (elsewhere called
Sensible Quantum Mechanics), which one might call Sensational Quantum Mechan-
ics [5, 6]. Such a more unified framework need not violate the limited assumptions
of Mindless Sensationalism, though it might do that as well and perhaps reduce to
Mindless Sensationalism only in a certain approximate sense.
To explain these frameworks in terms of an analogy, consider a classical model of
spinless massive point charged particles and an electromagnetic field in Minkowski
spacetime. Let the charged particles be analogous to the quantum world (or the
quantum state part of it), and the electromagnetic field be analogous to the con-
scious world (the set of conscious experiences with its measure µ(S)). At the level of
a simplistic materialist mind-body philosophy, one might merely say that the elec-
tromagnetic field is part of, or perhaps a property of, the material particles. At the
level of Mindless Sensationalism, the charged particle worldlines are the analogue of
the quantum state, the retarded electromagnetic field propagator (Coulomb’s law
in the nonrelativistic approximation) is the analogue of the awareness operators,
and the electromagnetic field determined by the worldlines of the charged particles
and by the retarded propagator is the analogue of the conscious world. (Here one
can see that this analogue of Mindless Sensationalism is valid only if there is no
free incoming electromagnetic radiation.) At the level of Sensational Quantum Me-
chanics, at which the conscious world may affect the quantum world, the charged
particle worldlines are partially determined by the electromagnetic field through the
electromagnetic forces that it causes. (This more unified framework better explains
the previous level but does not violate its description, which simply had the particle
worldlines given.) At a yet higher level, there is the possibility of incoming free
electromagnetic waves, which would violate the previous frameworks that assumed
the electromagnetic field was uniquely determined by the charged particle world-
lines. (An analogous suggestion for intrinsic degrees of freedom for consciousness
has been made by the physicist Andrei Linde [46].) Finally, at a still higher level,
there might be an even more unifying framework in which both charged particles
and the electromagnetic field are seen as modes of a single entity (e.g., to take a
popular current speculation, a superstring, or perhaps some more basic entity in “M
theory”).
Therefore, although it is doubtful that Mindless Sensationalism is the correct
framework for the final unifying theory (if one does indeed exist), it seems to me to
be a move in that direction that is consistent with what we presently know about
the physical world and consciousness.
This work has been supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering
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Council of Canada. Many of the people whom I have remembered as being influential
in my formulation of my ideas are listed at the end of [5], though of course none of
them are ultimately responsible for it, and indeed most of them might well disagree
with it.
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